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The Significance of Injustice for Bioethics
Teaching Ethics 17(1) pp 1-9 (2017)
Leslie P. Francis

In their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress famously listed
justice at the end, behind autonomy, beneficence, and non-maleficence. They were
explicit that this listing was not meant to suggest prioritization, but this is what
seems to have happened over the years in the teaching and practice not only of
bioethics but of other fields in applied ethics with which I am familiar.

There are many explanations for how justice has tended to come last. Justice isn’t a
single principle, but a topic area in social, political, and moral philosophy. There
is deep disagreement about which principle(s) of justice to adopt, and why. By
comparison, there is not deep disagreement about which principle of nonmaleficence to adopt (although there is disagreement about what counts as “harm”
for the purposes of applying non-maleficence). Moreover, justice finds its home as
a characteristic of social institutions, although it may also be used to characterize
individual relationships. In Rawls’s characterization, for example, justice is the
first virtue of social institutions. By contrast, many of the issues in applied ethics
fields deal with relationships between professionals and their clients. Even
business ethics deals with questions about individual action, such as lying, loyalty,
or responsibility. For my purposes, what is important is that these issues about

individuals and their relationships are treated first, rather than being situated within
a framework of justice.

It is thus not surprising that many texts in fields such as bioethics, engineering
ethics, business ethics, and even environmental ethics treat justice as something of
an afterthought. It may appear in chapters about access to health care, the social
responsibilities of business, or engineering and public welfare, or in environmental
justice units on discrimination and the location of polluting factories. But justice is
much less likely to appear as the overall ethical framework within which other
issues in the field are situated. Instead, the other issues come first, treated outside
of any framing justice might provide. When justice does appear, moreover, the
most likely selections are from Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) and Nozick’s
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). These works, while surely setting the stage for
discussions of justice over the ensuing 45 (yes, 45!) years, have been followed by
many important, more recent developments. These rarely make their way into
texts for teaching most applied ethics courses. They are even less likely to make
their way into bioethics courses.

Both the marginalization of justice and the failure to consider much recent work
are, I believe, deeply unfortunate. They are unfortunate in both directions:

bioethics has much to learn from these developments, and these developments
could well be tested and problematized in the context of bioethics. These
developments are also very useful teaching tools—an aspect I shall emphasize as
of particular interest today. So, let’s delve briefly into three theoretical
developments in the post-Rawlsian space that I think are particularly important but
that are too frequently off the radar screen in many bioethics texts and discussions:
--the discussions of luck egalitarianism
--the development of relational egalitarianism
--and, the evolution of non-ideal and partial compliance theory

Luck Egalitarianism

Rawls developed his view as a theory of justice for basic social institutions. But it
quickly came under criticism as a theory about distributional end states, initially
from Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Rawls’s veil of ignorance
experiment was premised on the assumption that differences in skills and talents,
economic and social conditions, and the like were arbitrary from a moral point of
view. As such, Rawls argued, they should not be able to influence basic institutions
for distributing the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Nozick argued that
Rawls could adopt this view only at his peril: Rawls, Nozick wrote, “can succeed

in blocking the introduction of a person's autonomous choices and actions (and
their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person
completely to certain sorts of ‘external’ factors. So denigrating a person's
autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a risky line to take for a theory
that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous
beings.” Here began so-called “luck egalitarianism”: the idea that inequalities
resulting from poor fortune are unjust, but inequalities resulting from poor choices
are not.

Inequalities in access to health care lie at the cusp of the interaction between bad
luck and bad choices. On the one hand, genetic endowments, epigenetic changes,
and social determinants of health are bad luck. Distributions of access to health
care that fail to address inequalities resulting from these factors would be unjust.
On the other hand, ski injuries might appear the result of poor choices, so perhaps
it would not be unjust if people were expected to pay for knee-repairs. Early on,
luck egalitarians noted the interaction between choice and luck: between poor
choices and their outcomes lies a great deal of luck. Many individuals make what
some argue are choices: to smoke, to have unprotected sex, or to avoid a flu shot.
Only a proportion of these will get lung cancer, become pregnant, or catch the flu.
So these health outcomes are neither pure luck nor pure choice.

A number of health policies may be informed by, or pose difficult issues for, luck
egalitarianism. Consider just these examples: what should be included in minimal
essential coverage? Who, if anyone, should be expected to pay copays or
deductibles as they access health care? Should premiums be adjustable for
individual behavior such as smoking, participation in wellness programs, or
engagement in risky activities? Should factors such as location or history of
alcohol abuse affect access to the scarce resource of liver transplantation?

In a paper published in 2006, Nir Eyal posed counter examples to standard
versions of luck egalitarianism. I present versions of them here that are adopted
for access to health care. First, Hero and Inconsiderate. Hero sees a burning
building and rushes into it to save a child. Inconsiderate wakes up in the middle of
the night to find his house on fire due to lightning. Both suffer similar burns. Had
Hero not run into the burning building, he would not have been injured. In all
other respects, such as ability to purchase insurance, they are the same. On
standard luck egalitarian accounts, Inconsiderate’s injury would be bad brute luck
but Hero’s would be bad option luck. So the disadvantages of Hero’s injury are
unjust but the disadvantages of Inconsiderate’s are not. But Hero’s bad fortune

seems unjust and surely does not reflect the desert considerations of primary
concern to luck egalitarians.

Eyal’s second example is called Acceptable and Saintly. Acceptable lives in an
area of the US where Zika infection is unlikely. Acceptable could have moved, but
does not, because of the costs and inconvenience of moving. Saintly, however,
does move, for the sole reason of avoiding Zika—and indeed is the only person
who does move. Soon after, a mutation in Zika results in widespread infection in
both locations, which Acceptable and Saintly both catch. Would it be just for
Saintly to be compensated for the damage when Acceptable is not? On some
standard luck egalitarian views, Acceptable’s choice to incur the risk would count
against compensation, so Saintly would have the stronger claim. Again, Eyal
thinks, this is counter intuitive: not every choice to incur risk should be viewed as
vitiating claims for compensation. (Think: having intercourse while using highly
effective forms of contraception, or walking outside alone at night.)

On Eyal’s view, these standard versions of luck egalitarianism are misguided
because they fail to take into account whether the choices are culpable. There is
something to this view. For example, people who deliberately choose not to get
health insurance when they could easily have afforded it might be regarded as

having chosen culpably. It may also help unmask some of the judgments that lie
behind students’ and others’ intuitions about whether alcoholics should be deprioritized for liver transplants, unmarried women should be held responsible for
pregnancies even if they used highly effective contraceptives, and people who do
not try to exercise or lose weight should bear some of the health costs that may
result. Some of the judgments students make may rest on assumptions about
whether any of these behaviors are culpable.

But there is much that is problematic about Eyal’s view, too. There are questions
about the availability and difficulty of alternatives, such as how much someone can
be expected to give up to purchase health insurance or how far someone can be
expected to travel to attend a weight loss class. There are questions about internal
constraints that affect choices, such as depression. These questions also may be
mediated by the presence of injustice, my third topic today. They surely are not
easy to resolve, but they are at the heart of many health policy debates today.
Having students consider luck egalitarianism’s insights and difficulties can help
them to see what is at issue in these debates.

Relational equality

Recognizing some of the difficulties with luck egalitarianism, Elizabeth Anderson
argued in “What is the Point of Equality?” that focusing on distribution as a
question of compensating for bad luck—who gets which opportunities, resources,
benefits, and the like—is mistaken. Instead, she defended a form of relational
equality, in which the fundamental question is the role of equality in ending
oppression. She understands oppression politically; one way to translate it into
health care is to consider how decisions are made: political decisions about the
structure of health care systems, institutional decisions about the structure of care
within institutions, and even decisions about patient care within the context of
provider patient relationships.

Here, let me use autonomy as an illustration. As autonomy is often presented, it’s
described in terms of respect for individual choices. For choices to be respected,
people must not be coerced and must have decision making capacity. People are
coerced if they are subject to unjustified threats of force and perhaps also wrongful
denial of rights or justified moral claims. (Think: refusals to provide obstetric care
without acquiescence in sterilization after delivery.) People have decision making
capacity if they have at least a basic understanding of their values, their conditions,
their treatment options, and the risks and benefits of these options; and if they are
able to apply this understanding to realize their values, at least in some

rudimentary way. Thus understood, the exercise of autonomy is a matter of
individual choice. Autonomy is not seen as primarily relational, much less as
located within a web of power relationships. But this is to frame autonomy
narrowly and in abstraction from the social contexts in which it is exercised.

Take discussions of managed care or, more recently, accountable care
organizations and whether they may fail to demonstrate respect for patient
autonomy. Ethical concerns raised about these forms of care delivery in terms of
patient autonomy are whether they present patients with a reasonable set of options
or whether they unjustifiably ration care. Concerns also include whether they are
sufficiently transparent about the motivations that may affect physician decision
making about care options or whether they conceal economic incentives that
present conflicts of interest. These forms of care delivery are seen as threats to
autonomy if they unjustifiably limit options or information. Only very occasional
discussions have considered the political power relationships in how these care
structures are organized. Oregon’s effort to expand Medicaid eligibility and paying
for it by ranking the care that would be covered was seen as an example of
deliberative democracy in action. Some of the original health maintenance
organizations such as Group Health of Puget Sound were seen as models of patient
participation in deciding coverage. But I have seen very little if any serious

political philosophy address how these organizations are structured or whether the
power relationships within them are problematic from the perspective of patient
autonomy. Similar points could be made about the delineation of essential health
benefits for purposes of the Affordable Care Act.

To be sure, there is frequent mention of the vulnerability of illness as a threat to
autonomy. But this vulnerability is seen primarily as individual deficiency, not as
a structural issue about the organization of health care. On the level of individual
patient care, shared or supported decision making may be brought in to address
failures of individual autonomy. But these structures are viewed as substitutes,
rather than being seen as integral to autonomous decision making itself.
Accountable care organizations are supposed to put the patient at the center of a
network of integrated care and to be accountable (to whom? Patients? Or payers?)
for improved care quality. According to NextGen HealthCare, a service provider
to accountable care organizations, “Now imagine this . . . healthcare providers
across the country, from primary care doctors and specialists, to hospitals and large
health systems, are all collaborating and coordinating care with each other to
improve outcomes for their patient populations – and getting paid well in return.”
Descriptions such at this at best put the patient at the center as the object of care.

They do not consider questions such as how to decide which collaborations matter,
what count as improved outcomes, or how very well paid physicians should be.

Here, bioethics has much to learn from a centerpiece of disability rights advocacy,
“nothing about us without us.” And here, too, bioethics confronts several different
aspects of non-ideal theory: the natural misfortune of illness, the impact of unjust
social institutions, and the ethical difficulties that arise when recognition of duties
of justice is uneven.

Non-Ideal and Partial Compliance Theory

John Rawls famously introduced the distinction between ideal theory and partial
compliance theory in A Theory of Justice. (1971) While theorizing about justice for
ideal circumstances, Rawls recognized that different approaches might be needed
where either natural or social circumstances were less than ideal. Non-ideal theory
treats issues such as how progress can best be made toward justice, what injustices
take precedence to address, what strategies are likely to create new roadblocks to
overcoming injustice, or what are the obligations of individuals or institutions
when others continue to behave unjustly. (Cohen 2000; Miller 2011). This last—

what to do when unjust behavior is fairly widespread—is specifically partial
compliance theory.

Rawls didn’t see the need for non-ideal theory as a problem about ideals, but as
about whether real world circumstances were such that ideals could reasonably be
applied to them. Within the past ten to fifteen years, discussions in political
philosophy of non-ideal and partial compliance theory have burgeoned. Like
Rawls, these discussions, largely see the problems as lying with existing
circumstances, not with the construction of ideals. For example, Zofia
Stemplowska, in “What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?” sees ideal theory as “theory
that fails to issue recommendations for how to improve our society that are
applicable for us here and now.” She thinks theories that assume full compliance
(and thus are inapplicable to present circumstances) can still be useful because they
provide a standard against which to judge whether comparatively we are taking
steps towards the ideal and to have a picture of what an ideal might look like. On
these views, ideal theory remains the touchstone and it seems reasonable that this
should be the primary focus of inquiry. Problems of how to get towards the ideal
are problems of transition that hopefully will pass. Or, they require attention to
what individuals should do as a matter of fairness when others are not doing their

share: should they try to make up for others, just do what would have been their
fair share, or give up if partial efforts will not solve ultimate problems.

An alternative, however, is that there are difficulties in the formulation of ideals
themselves. Amartya Sen (2009, 2006), for example, emphasizes the importance of
comparative rather than transcendental theories of justice. Sen argues that theories
of justice need not take a complete or totalist form for many reasons, including
information gaps, difficulties in judging among considerations that have a
dimension of weight, or the need to make political room for areas of agreement or
disagreement among different points of view. A major driver of Sen’s approach is
his view about the limits of social choice and the ability of decision procedures to
yield partial but incomplete agreement.

I agree with Sen that the problem lies in part with ideals, although my starting
places are somewhat different than his. As I see justice, it is a matter of ongoing
work at inclusion and flourishing: what next steps, at individual or social levels,
will enable individuals in all their differences to do well at what matters to them?
In my view, a picture of ideal justice might be so abstract as to be vacuous, so
fuzzy as to be unrecognizable, or perhaps even positively misleading.

Here, universal health care in the US is a useful example, which Sen uses. Seen
comparatively, the US is a more just society if it includes more people receiving
funding for health care appropriate to their conditions and choices, when others are
already receiving similar care. To make judgments of this kind, we do not need a
complete picture of what a fully just health care system would look like. Indeed,
given developing technology, changing understandings of the nature of disease, the
ever-shifting world of disease itself, and conflicting demands on social resources,
we may not be able to say what a fully just health care system would look like.
Idealization might tempt us to say: it would be a system in which everyone got the
greatest amount of needed health care possible under the circumstances. But this
idealization might be vacuous—what is this greatest amount?—or, more
disturbingly, it might lead us into a situation (not so unrecognizably like the
problems we have today) wherein everyone might think that getting more health
care for themselves is a matter of urgent justice, when it might not be
comparatively more just at all.

Expanding inclusion addresses what would be incremental improvements in the
justice of social institutions involved in health care. Another kind of non-ideal
problem is that of partial compliance: how to address circumstances in which
some are behaving in ways that have come to be recognized as unjust. On the

provider side, admittedly controversial examples might be the failure to provide
accommodations for patients with disabilities or the refusal to accept at least some
share of patients funded by Medicaid reimbursement rates. On the patient side,
again controversially, we might want to consider whether decisions not to
participate in the shared costs of health insurance coverage are unjust. Seeing these
decisions as partial compliance questions frames them as problems of participation
in furthering justice, as part of a justice as a social project. That’s a different frame
from more common ones in terms of whether the restrictions on liberty that may be
imposed are justified in order to avoid free rider problems or even to distribute
burdens of compliance fairly. It forces us to ask how decisions by some to opt out
might impact comparative improvements in justice in the sense of fostering
inclusion in the circumstances in which we actually live. That’s a very different
question from whether those who opt out take unfair advantage of those who do
not, much less whether in an ideally just world the freedom of individuals to opt
out would be recognized.

Conclusion

Let me sum up. In my judgment, applied ethics is ineluctably non-ideal and partial
compliance theory. It’s ethics in the context of unjust institutions and conduct.

Theorizing or teaching about concepts such as autonomy in abstraction from this
recognition is misleading. Instead, questions such as how to realize autonomy
should be framed in the context of incomplete justice. There’s much to be learned
from the past nearly 50 years of discussions of justice to help with this enterprise,
but they are too little known or discussed in much contemporary bioethics.

